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INTRODUCTION

For a number of years, negotiations have been taking place on
an international scale, usually under the auspices of the United
Nations or one of its specialized agencies, on a wide variety of
subjects involving technology transfer between the developed
countries (the North) and the less developed or developing countries (the South). Three primary groups are involved in the
United Nations negotiations. The first is known as the Group of
77, which now includes more than 120 developing countries, including countries in South and Central America, Africa, and Asia.
Within this group the degree of development varies from countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, which are quite developed, to the least developed countries, which include very large
countries such as Bangladesh and very small countries, a number
of which have recently become independent. Group B, the second
major group, includes the developed, market-oriented countries,
which include those of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The third major group,
Group D, includes the Soviet Union and other Eastern European
socialist nations. The comparative development of Group D countries sometimes leads them to agree with Group B countries on
transfer of technology items. In other cases, they align themselves
with the developing countries. These groups are not always defined strictly in accordance with economic terms because political
considerations often prevail. For example, Turkey is not part of
the Group of 77 where it logically should be, but is in Group B
because of its NATO affiliation. Two United Nations organizations that have been heavily involved in technology transfer negotiations are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Industrial Property
Organization (WIPO). UNCTAD is an ongoing organization,
which is involved in holding many negotiations having an impact
on technology transfer. Because UNCTAD operates in a very political manner, its critics feel that it is not actually interested in
helping developing nations, but in maintaining its own prominence. By proposing many seemingly radical and impractical
schemes, UNCTAD keeps itself in the forefront of controversy,
but nothing actually happens to help developing countries. WIPO
is in charge of administering a number of international treaties on
patents, trademarks, and copyrights. WIPO tends not to be as political as UNCTAD. WIPO, however, often seems to adopt attitfudes somewhat similar to those of UNCTAD in an apparent ef-
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fort to demonstrate to the developing nations that WIPO can also
get results.
II. UNCTAD CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY

In April 1974 the Pugwash Conference was held in Geneva, resulting in a proposed Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology, which was published and circulated by UNCTAD on July 15,
1974.1 Since that time, there have been a number of meetings of
governmental groups of experts under the auspices of UNCTAD.
While it was originally thought that an acceptable code could be
prepared quickly, that goal has yet to be obtained.
Those supporting the necessity of such a code assume that the
desired technology is principally possessed by large multinational
enterprises located in the developed nations. These businesses
must be forced to make technology available to the developing
countries on terms that are advantageous to the developing countries. The code's proponents further assume that the multinational organizations are eager to transfer their technology to developing nations and that governments must play a major role in
the negotiation and transfer process.
A.

Composition of Governmental Negotiating Delegations

One problem with the UNCTAD negotiations is that meetings
are conducted by groups of governmental "experts," who usually
do not have any experience in the field being discussed and certainly will not have any responsibility for operating in the area
after an agreement is reached. Most governmental delegations, including that of the United States, do not trust private industry
representatives and do not wish them on the delegation even
though they may truly be experts on the subject. Government officials tend to regard university professors to be more expert and
less biased and often consult them for opinions. Occasionally, the
United States does permit those from private industry to be a
part of the delegation, and I-have been a member of three delegations to the United Nations negotiation-m (Geneva.With one unusual exception, these meetings have been composed of people
who have little, if any, knowledge of the subject being negotiated,
although a few of the developed nations' delegations had compel. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/L.12 (1974).

304

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 14.301

tent people. Group of 77 negotiators are usually government employees who have never worked on the subject. Many are members of the permanent missions at Geneva and attend conferences
one after the other. Industries in the developing nations often disagree with the policies of their governments in international negotiations, but do not feel they are in a position to do anything
about it. The lack of industrial experts is unfortunate as these
meetings tend to drag on for years with very little positive results.
If a meeting were held with true experts on technology transfer
and it was decided that a code of conduct was necessary, an acceptable code could probably be negotiated in a rather short time.
This is not the case with the UNCTAD Code of Conduct.
B.

Transactions Covered

While many of those negotiating, writing, and speaking about
the proposed code believe it will only cover technology transfer
from large multinational corporations to smaller developing country organizations, a close reading of the proposed code indicates
that this is not true. For example, if a Canadian citizen owned a
United States patent and wished to grant a license to a United
States company, the agreement would be covered by the proposed
Code even if no know-how was transferred under the patent.
Some even feel that an employment invention agreement between
a corporation and an employee, who is a citizen of another country, might fall within the Code. The provisions of the proposed
Code are not limited to transactions with developing country organizations. They cover technology transfer agreements between
2
organizations located in two different developed countries.
I am an employee of a company that is a licensee more often
than it is a licensor and pays more in royalties than it receives in
royalties from others. Most other United States corporations are
also licensees more often than they are licensors. Even as a licensee, I see no need for a code to help my company deal with other
organizations in developed countries. At some time in the future,
I predict that there will be a code that may initially be voluntary,
but become mandatory at a later time. It is possible that national
governments may feel that the international code is such a good
idea that they will unilaterally adopt the provisions of this code.
2. See Blair, United Nations InternationalCode of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 13 J. M. J. PRAc. & PROC. 163 (1979).
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The negotiators apparently assume that all licensing agreements are many pages long involving provisions for guarantees of
product quality, suitability of the technology, training of personnel, and the transferring of complete information, spare parts,
and components. Those in the technology transfer business know
that, while such clauses may be appropriate in the transfer of
large, commercially operable chemical process technology, they
are not appropriate or even useful in many types of technology
transfer. For example, Itek Corporation has no agreements that
include any of the above clauses, nor do we, as a licensee, feel
they would be appropriate in our agreements. We have some
agreements that are only one-page long, in which we acquire
rights to make, use, and sell items developed by others.
While many companies, particularly larger ones, will be able to
live with any code that is promulgated, others will simply decide
it is not worth the bother and do even less international technology transfer than at present. The vast majority of small and medium-sized companies do no technology transfer with developing
countries and certainly will not be encouraged to investigate this
field under a code such as that proposed at the UNCTAD meetings. A recent draft of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct$ is a
twenty-six page document and is not complete because additional
language must be agreed upon and other chapters must be provided. This Code has been written about elsewhere." The pro-

3. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as of
16 November 1979, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/20 (1979).
4. See Blair, supra note 2; Wallender, Conflict in International Transfer, in
FINNEGAN & GOLDSCHEMER, THE LAw AND BusINEss OF LICENSING [hereinafter
cited as FINNEGAN ET AL.] 520.257-75 (1978), reprintedin 12 LES NOUVELLES No.
2 (1977); Lockwood, Commonality and Agreement with Third World on Technology Transfer, in FINNEGAN ET AL. at 520.277-85, reprintedin 12 LES NoUVELLES No. 2 (1977); Wionczek, Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology-When and Why?, in FINNEGAN ET AL. at 520.381-89, reprinted in 13 LES

No. 1 (1978); Finnegan, Code: A Panaceaor Pitfall? in FINNEGAN ET
13 LEs NOUVELLES No. 2 (1978); Joelson, United
States Law and the Proposed Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,
23 ANTITRUST BuLL. 835 (1978). See generally UNITED NATIONS INsTITUTE FOR
TRAINING AN RESEARCH, W. Chudson, The International Transfer of CommerNOUVELLES

AL. at 520.407-45, reprinted in

cial Technology to Developing Countries, Research Report No. 13 (1971); U.N.
Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Transfer of Operative Technology at the Enterprise
Level, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/151 (1972);
AND DEVELOPmENT,

UNrED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE

Guidelines for the Study of the Transfer of Technology to

Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/9 (1972); UNrrED

NATIONS INDUS-
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posed Code's Table of Contents shows the complexity of the
Code, which applies to many agreements that should be very
straightforward and simple.
C.

The Necessity of the Code

Politicians and economists from a number of the developing
countries and the United Nations think a code of conduct for
technology transfer is necessary because developed country organizations have taken advantage of developing countries for many
years. They feel that developed countries and developed country
organizations have an obligation to transfer technology to developing countries and that the incremental costs of the technology
transfer are the only costs that should be recouped. Those familiar with technology development realize that most research does
not result in real products so that often the profits and licensing
returns on one product line must be used to support general research and development activity. If each particular licensing
transaction involved only the incremental cost of the technology
transfer and, by analogous reasoning, each product line profit
only reflected the profit of that particular line, there would be no
money left to do any new product development. If there is no
incentive to transfer technology, prospective technology transferors will turn their attention to areas that are more useful and
profitable.
Developing countries feel that their citizens are at an unfair
disadvantage when negotiating with large, developed country corporations. Thus, many developing countries have passed legislation and regulations making negotiations at least equal. Developing nations wish to follow Japan's example. Under the Japanese
TRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, Guidelines for the Acquisition of Foreign

Technology in Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. E.73.II.B.1 (1973); U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Aff., The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corporations by
Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/12 (1974); UNCTAD, Major Issues
Arising from the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc.

TD/B/AC.11/10/Rev.2 (1975); UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.1/Supp.1/Rev.1 (1975);
UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernment Group of Experts on an International
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology on its Third Session, U.N. Doc. TD/

AC.1/9 (1977); UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology-Its Implications for Development and Environment, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/22 (1978). See also Joelson, The

Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business
Practices, 8 L. & POL'Y

INT'L Bus.

837-51 (1976).
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system, a government agency regulated and ruled on many technology transfer agreements. Developing nations do not consider
that Japan was a highly developed and literate society able to
utilize the transferred technology. Most of the developing countries have not yet reached that state of development.
Another viewpoint put forth by the developing countries is that
technology is a part of a universal human heritage and should
therefore be available to all. All countries have the right of access
to technology. The same reasoning implies that all countries
should have the right of access to the oil and natural resources
owned by the developing nations. Taking this argument to its logical extremes, everyone should have access to everything. I doubt
if you will find any organization that has spent money to develop
its own technology will agree that this technology should be made
available to all. Developing nations feel that they are entitled to
special treatment in technology transfer transactions and that
they need an unrestricted flow of technological information. They
have come to the conclusion that an international, legally-binding
instrument is the only effective way to regulate the transfer of
technology.
Many of the developing nations feel that they have been
abused by over forty restrictive business practices that developed
nations have imposed on them in the past. These restrictions
include:
(1) Restricting the use of technology after expiration or termination of the agreement;
(2) restricting the freedom of the acquiring party with respect to
similar or competing technologies or products;
(3) restricting the use of technology after expiration of the patents or other industrial property rights involved;
(4) requiring the acquiring party to grant exclusive sales rights to
the supplying party;
(5) requiring'the acquiring party to grant back improvements on
the acquired technology to the supplying party;
(6) restricting the research and development activities of the acquiring party;
(7) restricting the receiving party's adoption or improvement of
the technology;
(8) requiring the acquiring party to use personnel designated by
the supplying party;
(9) fixing the price of products made by using transferred
technology;
(10) restricting the export of products made using the technology;
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(11) requiring the acquiring party to refrain from challenging the
validity of patents and other industrial property rights;
(12) requiring acceptance of additional technology or goods not
needed or wanted by the acquiring party;
(13) requiring the acquiring party to obtain its raw material,
equipment, and other parts from specified sources;
(14) restricting patent pool or cross-licensing agreements that impode territorial quantity or price restrictions.
Many of these restrictions are not necessary in most agreements,
but others are legitimate in certain fact situations, showing the
near impossibility of making a universal code for the transfer of
technology.
The developing countries want the Code of Conduct to apply to
technology transfer arrangements between foreign enterprises and
their subsidiaries. The United States Department of Justice has
always taken the position that a company and its subsidiary are
really one entity and should be treated as such. This is still a
point that is being discussed at the UNCTAD conference. The
final result is unclear at present.
III.

UNCTAD MEETINGS ON THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

A.

Patent Meeting-1975

There have been two major UNCTAD meetings held relating to
the role of intellectual property in international transfer of technology. Governmental "experts" from over fifty countries met in
September 1975 to discuss a document prepared for the meeting
by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNCTAD, and WIPO. 5 The vast majority of people attending this meeting were not experts in the subject, and only the two
nongovernmental employees were delegates. The meeting dealt
with the same issues that had been addressed at WIPO's meetings on the Paris Convention. It served primarily as a forum for
the airing of the complaints about patents by economists and
other government employees of the developing nations. The developing nations felt that the majority of 'patents obtained in
their country were not used in manufacturing in that country.
The developing nations felt the Paris Convention did not take
5. UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology
to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TDIB/AC.11/19/Rev.1 (1975).
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into consideration the needs of the developing countries.
The developing country representatives presented numerous
proposals. They felt that the "national treatment" philosophy
should be eliminated. This philosophy provides that all nations
are to be treated equally. The developing countries preferred discrimination in their favor.
Developing nations' proposals required that patents must actually be worked in the country where the patent is issued. The
invention covered by the patent must be manufactured in the
patent-granting country. Developing countries do not regard importation as satisfactory working. In actual practice, however, if a
company obtains patents in thirty countries, it would not be possible to manufacture products in all of them within the two or
three-year time period within which the developing countries feel
the manufacture should be started. Often a product will be manufactured in one country and exported to other countries in the
same region. A developing country in which a manufacturing
plant is established will be very interested in exporting that product to surrounding countries. If the patent owner establishes a
manufacturing plant in each of the surrounding countries, no
market will be left in those countries, thus isolating international
trade.
Another proposal shortened the duration of patents. The life of
patents in most countries is arbitrary, but it is difficult to say that
the duration of all patents should be shorter. The commercial
product life varies tremendously among different technologies.
Most patents' lives have been selected as a compromise that is
about right for many products. Shortening the life of patents
would not encourage manufacturers to innovate. In the future,
developing nations will own a number of patents and will probably wish to make patent life longer.
Another proposal stated that a patent should not include the
exclusive right of importation. Closely related was the proposition
that patents should not be used to limit exportation of products
from one country to another. Developing nations feel that exclusive patent rights should only protect manufacture in certain locations and should not control exports or imports. Such a proposal could actually hurt the developing nations. Without the
export-import controls provided by patents, a developing nation
organization owning patent rights would be unable to protect itself against manufacturers in other countries that might be able
to manufacture the product more efficiently because of larger cap-
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ital resources and access to more efficient labor. This could drive
the local organization out of business. The licensing business
would be impossible because the licensee could not protect himself from the licensor, other licensees, or others having similar
technology.
Inadequate patent disclosure was also a target of the developing nations' attacks. This is particularly interesting because patent offices in most countries, including developing countries, object to the large amount of disclosure that occurs in patents filed
by United States companies. Most other patent offices require the
deletion of large amounts of disclosed material. The law of all
countries of the world, except the United States, Canada, and the
Philippines, is that the patent owner who files first in the patent
office wins. For this reason, the developing nations and others
have structured their law to encourage early filing. This often
means that an early laboratory development will be filed. A patent is usually issued some time before the technical information
necessary for commercial implementation is available. If such information were available and included in the patent, disclosure
might involve thousands of pages of information and drawings
that would be entirely too bulky for a patent, making the patent
system worthless.
One developing country proposal moved to change the principle
of independence of patents in each country. This principle is that
each patent is a separate document. If a patent is invalid in one
country, it may still be valid in another. Those proposing this
change have not thought the subject through. There are a number
of instances in which a patent is perfectly valid in one country
and invalid in another country because the laws of each country
differ. For example, a company may have a patent in the United
States naming one individual as the inventor and own a patent on
the same invention in another country with different inventors. In
each case, the differences in these patents is completely in accordance with local law. In the United States, a patent is awarded to
the first to invent, not the first to file. Publication is a bar to
obtaining a patent under certain circumstances in many countries, but it is not a bar under the laws of other countries. Something may be a patentable invention in one country and not in
another. If the laws of all countries were the same, they were all
interpreted the same, and the facts occurring in each country
were the same, a better argument could be made for some kind of
universal validity test. In practice, however, this abolishment of
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the independence of patents is not logicaLor-easonable. This first
meeting6 did not accomplish any particularly startling results. It
did, however, call for another meeting.
B.

Trademark Meeting-1977

The second meeting took place in October 1977 and was entitled "The Role of the Industrial Property System in the Transfer
of Technology." This title differs from the earlier title because it
is broadened sufficiently to include trademarks. Although a draft
of a document on patents7 was submitted to various delegations
who were planning to attend the meeting, most of the meeting
was devoted to the subject of trademarks, which are not thought
to have a very large role in the transfer of technology. The trademark document s was prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat. The
people preparing the document had no knowledge of trademarks
in the commercial world. The same was true for those in attendance at the meeting, where there were only three people from the
private sector.
The developing nations emphasized that countries should have
the right to revoke or challenge trademarks in the public interest.
Countries can revoke or forfeit trademarks when the owner or licensee of the marks has speculated or misused the trademarked
product with regard to price or quality to the detriment of the
public. In actual practice, if a trademark is forfeited or revoked,
the trademark becomes available to all. Many products will have
the same trademark, leading to confusion and consumer deception. Thus, the trademark owner is penalized, but the public is in
a worse position than before.
The developing nations also felt that the Paris Convention
should provide that developing countries can refuse to register or
can invalidate a registered trademark when it has been revoked in
the country of origin. The finding of invalidity in a particular
6. UNCTAD, Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Group of
Experts, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.2/L.2 (1975).
7. UNCTAD, The International Patent System: A Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, U.N. Doc. TD/BC.6AC.32

(1977).
8. UNCTAD, The Impact of Trademarks on the Development Process of the

Developing Country, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.33 (1977), later published as
UNCTAD, The Role of Trademarks in Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TDIB/

C.6/AC.3/3/Rev.1 (1979).
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country because of substantial prior use in that country should
have no bearing on the validity of the mark in another country
because the use may not have occurred there. The plans proposed
by the developing countries would also require any industrial
property office, such as the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, to provide, on request, information concerning the validity
of trademarks to other industrial property offices. In practice, it
would seem to be more useful if the foreign trademark office acquired such information from the trademark owner because the
local industrial property office often does not have adequate information available.
There were several other less sweeping suggestions made by the
developing countries. Trademarks should be revoked if they are
not used. The principle of national treatment, which says that the
citizens of each nation should be treated in a nondiscriminatory
fashion by other nations and should be treated the same as their
own citizens, should not constitute an obstacle in attempts to reduce the harmful effects of foreign-owned trademarks in developing nations. Preferential treatment should be provided to nationals of developing countries by relieving priority periods and fees.
Appellations of origin, which are words or names used to describe
products that are known by the location from which they come,
and are the sole, nontransferable property of the country where
they exist, prevail over trademarks. Trademarks containing geographic indications should only be registered by nationals of the
countries where the geographic indication is located, if the geographic indication is an appellation of origin or can be interpreted
as an indication of source. There should be no industrial designs
and no service marks.
The results of this particular meeting were inconclusive, as was
true of the 1975 meeting.
IV.

THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY

The Paris Convention is the basic international treaty relating
to patents and trademarks. It was originally signed in 1883. 9 It
has been revised a number of times and has been the subject of a"

9.

G.

BODENHAUSEN,

GuIDE TO THE, APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION

FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 9
TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 67 (1975).

(1968); 1 S.

LADAS, PATENTS,
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number of meetings at the United Nations for additional revision
since the last revision in Stockholm in 1967.10 A number of items
have been discussed in these Paris Convention revision meetings,
many of which are similar to points raised in other North/South
discussions. These Paris Convention discussions have involved
the following fourteen points:1 '
(1) National Treatment-The developing nations propose that
nationals of developing nations be treated preferentially by other
countries.12
(a) They suggest that all countries should charge developing
country nationals fifty percent of the fee charged others
for
18
obtaining and maintaining patents and trademarks.
(b) The developing nations would have a fifty percent longer
priority period in which to file their patent and trademark
applications to get 14the benefit of the original filing date in a

particular country.
(2) Independence of Patents-As referred to above in connection

with the UNCTAD meetings on the Role of Intellectual Property
in the International Transfer of Technology, the developing countries wish to have interdependent patent-xights. After considerable
negotiation, the developing nations have moderated their position
and now are merely asking for information about corresponding
patents in other countries. 5
(3-5) Local Working-These items are all related and concern
nonworking and delays in working of patented inventions in the
local country." Compulsory licenses for nonworking and the granting of licenses of right in certain cases were requested. After considerable negotiation, it appears that the Paris Convention may be
revised to provide that local working can be required and that im10. BODENHAUSEN, at 9; LADAs, at 89, supra note 10.
11. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, Report adopted by the

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on the Revisions of the Paris Convention 11-14, U.N. Doc. PR/GE/I/O (1975); 935 OFFIcIAL GAzETTE OF THE UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 446-48 (1975); WIPO, The Fourteen Ques-

tions of the First Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, U.N.
Doc. PR/GE/I/2 (1975).
12. See WIPO Basic Proposals, Memorandum by the Director General, in
preparationfor the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Con-

vention, Mar. 4, 1980, U.N. Doc. PR/DC/3 (1979).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. art. A,
Id. art. B,
Id. art. 12
Id. art. 5A,

at 66.
at 72.
bis, at 76.
at 38.
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portation of a product is not working of the patent unless the local
country wishes to regard it as so. At present, nonexclusive,
nonvoluntary (compulsory) licenses may be provided for nonworking unless the patentee justifies its nonworking. While the
nonvoluntary license may be nonexclusive in many cases, there are
approved provisions for it to be compulsory in the present revision
talks. The United States has asked for this subject to be reopened
and has pointed out that a patent owner could be stopped from
practising his invention in a country by his own patent if another
had an exclusive license. Thus, in some instances, the patent owner
would be better off if he hadn't filed a patent application on his
invention in that country in the first place. This matter has not yet
been resolved.
(6) PreferentialTreatment-Preferentialtreatment without reciprocity has been merged into point (1) above.
(7) Technical Assistance-A new Paris Convention article 12
ter 7 would provide for assistance to developing countries in matters of industrial property.
(8) Types of Protection Other than Patents-Negotiations are
continuing over how to handle inventor's certificates in the Paris
Convention. 18 The Group D countries, particularly the Soviet
Union, want inventor's certificates to be given the same status as
patents. The United States and others have said that they are willing to do so, but that if a country has inventor's certificates, it
must grant patents and inventor's certificates in the same field.
The grounds and time limits for challenging patents and inventor's
certificates must be the same, and the term of the patent and the
inventor's certificates must be the same.
(9) Trademarks and Appellations of Origin-Trademarks and
appellations of origin are the subject of considerable discussion.1'
Developing nations and some of the Group B countries, particularly France, wish to disallow the use of appellations of origin as
trademarks by those from other countries. While a number of compromises have been suggested, some of which are acceptable to the
United States, this question remains unresolved.
(10) Paris Convention Reservations-Originally,the developing
countries wanted to be permitted to make reservations with re-

17. Id. at 82.
18. Id. art. 1, at 18.
19. WIPO, Working Group on Conflict between an Appellation of Origin and
a Trademark, Preparatory Intergovernmental Committee on the Revision of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, various documents
including PR/WGAO/II/2; PR/WGAO/II/3; PR/WGAO/I13.Rev.; PR/WGAO/II/
4; PR/WGAO/ll/5; PR/WGAO/H/6; PR/WGAO/II/7; PR/DC/4.
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spect to certain provisions of the revised Paris Convention, but this
request has apparently been dropped.
(11) Deletion of Paris Convention Article 24-The developing
countries wish to delete article 24 of the Paris Convention, which
provides that any country may inform WIPO that the Paris Convention shall be applicable to all, or just part of, the territories for
which it is responsible.2 0 This subject has not been resolved.
(12) Article 5 quater2 ' of the ParisConvention-This article provides that when a product is imported into a country where there
is a patent on the process of making the product, the patent owner
shall have all the rights with regard to the imported product that
are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of importation on the basis of a process patent if the product was manufactured in that country. The developing nations are concerned that
they would not be permitted to give process patent protection to
products produced by the patented process in their country, giving
no protection from imported products produced by the patented
process. They feel, therefore, that article 5 quater should be
changed. The Group B countries say that the developing countries
can do as they desire on this subject. They see no reason for a
change in article 5. This matter is still under discussion.
(13) Priority Privileges-Developing nations wish special privileges with respect to the right of priority. This was discussed in
connection with (1) and (6) above.
(14) Unanimity-The process for amending the Paris Convention
has been the subject of the most controversy in the revision discussion. In the past, the Paris Convention has been amended only by
unanimous vote, although the Paris Convention itself does not require this. WIPO is now part of the United Nations, and United
Nations document agreements are usually adopted on a two-thirds
majority vote. A diplomatic conference to revise the Paris Convention meeting in February and March 1980 was supposed to revise
and sign a new treaty in a six-week period. Unfortunately, the unanimity rule became a problem. The entire period of the conference
dealt with this subject. The United States was the only country
that held out for unanimity in changing the provisions of the Paris
Convention.2" The other Group B countries were willing to accept
less than unanimity. Finally, all of the countries except the United
States unofficially agreed that the Paris Convention should be revised by consensus. If consensus could not be obtained, a two-

20. Basic Proposals, supra note 13, at 104.
21. Id. at 64.
22. U.S.

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REPORT ON PARIs

TION (March 1980).

TREATY

CONVEN-
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thirds majority of those countries voting, as long as more than
twelve were not opposed to the change, would be required. The
United States suggested that it could accept a move to change the
unanimity requirement. It proposed that passage be conditioned
on no more than two countries voting against any proposal. The
president of the conference, who was from a developing nation,
ruled without a vote that the consensus rule of thirteen was to be
the rule of the conference.23 With only one more day of the conference remaining, it was adjourned without resolving the other
problems discussed above.
The United States delegation, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, and the State Department have been discussing unanimity with a number of other countries and organizations, such as the United States Trademark Association, the Licensing Executives Society, the American Patent Law
Association, the American Bar Association Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Section, the Pacific Industrial Property Association,
and the United States Chamber of Commerce. These organizations have been very supportive of the United States delegation.
They have contacted a number of their non-United States members to explain the situation to them and to urge them to discuss
the matter with their local government to see if some support can
be generated for the United States position. The "more than
twelve" idea has the support of the European Economic Community (EEC), which has voted as a bloc in the Paris Convention.
The EEC countries would oppose the idea of an exclusive compulsory license being granted under a patent, and thus, the EEC
countries together with the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan would be able to stop that particular
provision from being approved. France, however, feels very
strongly about the appellation of origin provisions, and the EEC
will probably go along with France. The United States probably
cannot get more than twelve countries to vote against the appellation of origin outside of the EEC. In effect, the EEC has reached
a position where it can veto any provision it wishes, but the
United States, with only one vote, will not be able to do so.
Apparently, the United States will attend the diplomatic con-

23. Professor G.H.C. Bodenhausen, former Director General of BIRPI (now
WIPO) and a recognized authority on the Paris Convention, wrote that the unanimity rule will still prevail unless the United States drops its opposition. 11
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC)

427 (1980).
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ference and the WIPO meetings to set the time and place for the
resumed conference. The United States position is still under discussion. The United States will probably argue against the use of
the "more than twelve" rule and may not agree to sign the treaty
if any provisions are adopted without a unanimous vote.
V.

NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS A

COMPARATIVELY MINOR IssuE

There have been a number of other negotiations in which technology transfer is a fairly minor issue. Even in these negotiations,
technology transfer situations may be very important with respect
to a particular matter.
A.

Restrictive Business Practices

After a number of years of meetings 24 and the publication of a
number of documents, 25 an UNCTAD Conference on Restrictive
Business Practices agreed to A Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices.26 This document will be transmitted to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption as a resolution. While the
Principles and Rules do not specifically discuss technology transfer, many could be regarded as relating to technology transfer.
Section D4e provides that enterprises should refrain, in certain
circumstances, from imposing restrictions on the importation of
goods that have been legitimately marked abroadtwith a mark
identical or similar to the trademark for similar goods, when the
marks are of the same origin. A licensee of technology and trademarks in one country might not, in some circumstances, be able
24. Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to
Restrictive Business Practices, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 837-74

(1976);

UNCTAD, Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Sixth Session, U.N. Docs. TD/250, TD/B/C.2/201, TD/B/
C.2/AC.6/20 (1979).

25. UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/104/
Rev.1 (1971); UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices-Studies on the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America
and Japan, U.N. Doc. TD/B/390 (1973); UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Prac-

tices in Relation to the Trade and Development of Developing Countries, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/C.2/119/Rev.1 (1974); UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business

Practices in the European Economic Community, U.N. Doc. TD/B/608 (1977).
26. UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices,
U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF./10 (1980).
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to prevent the importation of a product marked with the same
trademark that was imported by another licensee in another
country. Section D4f discusses the control of the supply of goods
or services and the form or quantities in which goods may be sold.
This may have an impact on technology transfer. The real impact
of the section's qualifications and exceptions will depend on how
it is interpreted and applied.
In addition to the Principles and Rules, UNCTAD has published the first draft of a model law on restrictive business practices to assist developing countries in devising appropriate legislation.27 This model law provides for the registration and approval
of many types of agreements by the local government and defines
a number of restrictive agreements of which the administering authority must be notified. Whether this draft will be used by developing countries in enacting restrictive business practices legislation remains to be seen.
B. Law of the Sea
The United Nations Report on the Third Conference of the
Law of the Sea 28 includes article 14429 entitled "Transfer of Technology," which provides that the authority administering the activities envisaged by the Law of the Sea Conference will take
measures to acquire technology and scientific knowledge relating
to the activities of the sea and will promote and encourage transfer of this technology to developing nations.
Article 5 of Annex 111,30 which is entitled "Transfer of Technology," provides that anyone submitting a proposed plan of work to
the authority to conduct activities such as mining or drilling for
oil shall make available to the authority a general description of
the equipment and methods to be used. The applicant shall agree
to make his technology available to the enterprise established by
the proposed treaty or the authority administering the Law of the
Sea operations on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. The applicant's technology must be available to developing nations in certain circumstances. Thus, by a compulsory license arrangement, the technology of any particular organization
will be available to others. This will not encourage innovation, as
27. UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/16Rev.1 (1979).
28. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980).
29.
30.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 152.
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the innovator's competitors will be able to use the innovations by
paying the royalty established by the United Nations Authority.
C.

United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development (UNCSTD)

In August 1979 the United Nations Conference on Science and
Technology for Development was held. It was attended by representatives of many nations, and some of them, particularly the
United States, spent substantial time and money attempting to
prepare position papers3 1 on science and technology for development. In these papers, transfer of technology played a very small
part, although some felt it should have played a much larger part.
The developing nations presented their usual demands. Unfortunately, the conference did not accomplish anything concrete.3 2
D. Related National or Regional Regulations
The Latin American countries have attempted to regulate technology transfer through the AndeanPact and national legislation.
Other developing nations, such as Nigeria, have enacted legislation and regulations. The developing countries are attempting to
emulate Japan, which closely controlled incoming technology
transfer for a number of years after World War II. As Japan's
technology advanced, the regulations were liberalized and are now
practically nonexistent. The major difference between post-World
War II Japan and the developing countries is that the Japanese
were able to develop the appropriate societal infrastructure to
build upon technology that was transferred to their corporations.
With the high level of education and dedication of the Japanese,
they were able to adapt technology and improve upon it themselves. Unfortunately, the developing nations are not yet able to
do this.

31.

The U.S. Position Paper is U.S. DEP'T oF STATE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLPublication 8966, U.S. Superintendent of Documents,

OGY FoR DEVELOPMENT,

Stock No. 044-000-01695-8 (1979).
32. Maddock, Development: Where are the Real Experts?, 282 NATURE 437
(1979). See also Roark, U.N. Technology Meeting Lacked Clear Direction, 205
ScIENCE 1236 (1979); New LDC Demands for Technology Transfer, Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 17, 1979, at 60.
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The developing countries do not have the ability to design,
build, or operate manufacturing facilities for many modern products, nor do they have the marketing ability to distribute or service these products. The reason is not that the citizens of these
countries lack innate intelligence. The inability to produce high
technology products stems from the low level of education and
training. Various components that are needed to manufacture
many products are unavailable, including a lack- of distribution
channels, available capital, and ability of the local society to use
these products.
A.

The Developing Countries' Solution

The developing countries feel that forcing technology-owning
enterprises in developed nations to transfer technology to the developing countries under regulated conditions favorable to the developing countries will provide a solution to their problems. The
developing nations hope to accomplish these objectives by means
of international treaties and codes of conduct. The negotiations
are usually initiated and encouraged by United Nations employees, national governmental employees, and various consultants,
many with an academic background in economics, but rarely, if
ever, with industrial developmental or technology transfer
experience.
Unfortunately, even if developing countries get all the treaties,
codes, and regulations they have requested, they would have little, if any, positive impact on the economy, society, or people of
the developing countries. Industrial technology in market-oriented developed countries is not owned by governments, but by
private organizations. Even when governments own certain patent
rights, the government usually does not have the know-how to
make real products. While some technology will be transferred to
developing countries in any event, much more would be transferred if there were more incentive to do so. This is particularly
true for the small and medium-sized companies, which do not
have large internal staffs of licensing people, lawyers, or economists. Itek Corporation has annual sales of over $300,000,000, but
at present, we have no patents issued in developing countries and
have no plans tb obtain a . Our company, as is true with many
others, has a number of internal priorities, most of which relate to
making money. There are many more projects proposed internally
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than we are capable of accomplishing. The items which we undertake are usually selected on financial return criteria. Attempting
to license some of our technology to developing nations, therefore,
does not receive a high priority. While we have nothing against
the developing nations, and philosophically would be quite interested in helping them, specific incentives sufficient for us to
spend considerable time negotiating technology transfer agreements, obtaining government approvals, and using a number of
our expert people in attempting to teach developing countries
enough so that they could manufacture our product, market it,
and service it are lacking. Of course, this is even more true for a
company that might have ten to fifteen million dollars in annual
sales. Even though they might have technology that would be useful to a developing nation, they cannot spend the time to license
it as they lack the capacity. Without incentives, most organizations will not get involved in international technology transfer to
developing nations.
B. Patents in Developing Countries
Most companies in developed countries, particularly those that
are small or medium-sized, have few trademarks and even fewer
patents in developing countries. Trademarks last forever, and it is
sometimes useful t6 establish a trademark in a country even without immediate plans to use it. At present, there are few incentives
to obtain patents in developing nations. The World Intellectual
Property Organization has noted that there are very few patent
applications filed in the developing nations. It is rare when a
small or medium-sized company in the United States spends the
money necessary to get patents in these countries. Even large
multinational corporations usually attempt to patent only a small
minority of their inventions in developing countries. For example,
compare the applications filed on inventions in developing countries with the number filed in developed countries in 1976:13

33. WIPO, Industrial Property Statistics for 1976, U.N. Doc. 1P/STAT/
1976/1 (1977).
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Developing Country
Argentina
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Ghana
India
Kenya
Tanzania
Uruguay
Zambia

Developed Country
Australia
Canada
Denmark
France
East Germany
West Germany
Ireland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
USSR
Switzerland
USA

[Vol. 14:301

Number Filed
Per Year

Number Filed Per
Week (Average)

4,262
154
171
756
622
45
3,093
93
57
270
152

82
3
3
15
12
1
59
2
1
5
3

Number Filed
Per Year

Number Filed Per
Week (Average)

14,117
26,163
5,901
39,890
6,474
61,705
2,865
161,016
2,384
14,639
8,805
132,855
16,513
102,344

271
503
114
767
125
1,189
55
3,100
46
284
169
2,550
319
1,970

The number of invention applications filed per week is the
most meaningful statistic. Bangladesh, the eighth most populous
country in the world, has three invention applications per week,
while tiny Luxembourg has forty-six. India, the second most populous country, has fifty-nine, while Ireland has fifty-five and Denmark has nearly twice as many. This lack of patent filing in the
developing countries occurs for two reasons. First, the expense involved today often runs to more than $1,000 per invention per
country. This cost includes translation fees, government fees, and
legal costs. Many products include ten patentable inventions in
their first development embodiment. If this is the case, attempting to get patents in a large number of foreign countries becomes
financially impossible. As a practical matter, many United States
corporations file less than half of their inventions in foreign countries. Corporations usually choose a small number of countries in
which to file, when they file at all. In a vast majority of the countries in the world, no patents are fied by the interested corpora-
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tions. Second, inventors often fail to apply for a patent because
they do not feel the patent will be used enough to produce an
adequate return on investment. If no patents are owned by a
company in a developing country, any transfer of technology to
an organization in that country must occur through a license of
technical know-how. Even though copies of patents issued in the
United States or other countries are available to the developing
countries, it is usually much more practical to pay the technology
owner for the rights to his technical know-how than to attempt to
develop it independently. In addition to being cheaper, this
method avoids duplication of effort.
C. Licensing Executives Society's Solutions
In preparation for the United Nations Conference on Science
and Technology meeting, the Licensing Executives Society (LES)
made a number of proposals3 to the United States Government.
For the most part, the LES proposals were ignored by the government, but a brief review of the proposals is appropriate because
they appear to be the type that might have some actual positive
impact.
The LES plan called on the United States and the United Nations to take a number of steps to improve the technology transfer process. First, they should recommend to developing nations
that their organizations hire expert licensing consultants to represent them in negotiating technology transfer and to assist
them in finding the appropriate technology. The process of negotiating and contracting for technology transfer is highly sophisticated. This is not commonly understood in developing countries,
which have minimal experience with technology business transactions. Developing nations must require that their local governmental or nongovernmental organizations hire expert licensing
consultants to represent them in finding appropriate technology.
Many developing nations are adverse to using the expertise of developed nations. If this idea can be presented in such a way that
they are not asking for help, but are acting rationally in retaining
an expert to work to accomplish their own objectives, it may succeed. The national origin of the expert should not matter as long

34. For complete details of the proposed LES plan, see LES USA Proposal
to Encourage Technology Transfer to the DevelopingNations, 12 LEs NoUVELLEs 11-15 (blue pages) (Dec. 1977).
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as he is a legitimate expert in technology transfer and licensing.
The LES proposals also called for the establishment of various
educational programs. One would provide for technology transfer
fellowship programs to train technology transfer experts for developing nations. Programs to educate engineers, accountants,
and marketing experts for developing nations would also be created. The training of farmers from developing nations would be
increased. An opportunity for officials of developing countries to
study techniques used to attract industrial investment by other
national, territorial, and state governments would also be
provided.
Other proposals called for the creation of incentives to aid in
the technology transfer process. One calls for incentives for local
businesses within developing nations to acquire technology from
others and to assist them in capitalizing on such technology
transfer. Another calls for the establishment of a specific technology transfer incentive program providing the necessary incentives
to private industry to tranfer technology to the developing nations. The LES recommended that the large amounts of aid
money not be provided directly to developing nations' governments, as has often been the case with foreign aid programs in the
past. The money should be spent either by the government of the
developed nation furnishing the money or by an international
agency such as the World Bank. The developing nations should
provide some of the money used to finance the technology transfer, as this will require them to be selective. The financing country would pay a significant technology transfer incentive payment
to the owner of the technology.
The LES recommended that twenty-five percent of the payment be made when the initial arrangement is concluded, twentyfive percent be made at the actual start of construction of the
plant, and the remaining half paid upon completion of the plant.
The financing country would pay the costs of training people to
work in the plant. It would enter into a cost-sharing arrangement
with the developing nation organization for the cost of building
and equipping the plant in the developing nation. The cost of
building the plant would be divided between the financing country and the developing nation. The developing nation would provide ten to twenty-five percent of the financing. This would insure that it is really interested in the particular technology and
plant being provided.
The developing nation operating the plant should pay a royalty
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on net sales. The payment would be made to the technology owner for a period of fifteen years after the plant is completed and
operating. In some instances, a royalty as low as one percent may
encourage the technology owner to assist in getting the plant operating. More commonly, the royalty will be in the five to fifteen
percent range.
For a period of ten years the technology owner would provide
thirty professional-level technical man-days per year to transfer
improvement technology to the plant sharing the cost with the
developing country. In this way, improvements in the technology
will be made available to the developing nation licensee, and
there will be access to this improvement for the ten year period.
If the licensee still desires improvement technology following the
ten year period, an arms-length agreement could be negotiated.
At the expense of the financing country, the technology owner
would train people with the five year goal of running the plant
without employing more than two people from outside the developing country. The ten year goal will be to run the plant without
employing anyone from other countries. Such training is necessary so that the people from the developing country will not be
doing merely low level labor, but will also become trained for supervisory positions within the plant.
In exchange, the technology owner would receive a royalty-free
nonexclusive license to use any.improvements conceived or developed by plant employees during the eleven years following the
construction of the plant. This would encourage a full disclosure
of improvement technology to the licensee. The technology owner
would be able to grant a sublicense on the licensee's improvements only to those who have taken a license under his basic
technology. In arrangements in which technology is being exchanged, it is always preferable to have each party make complete
disclosure to the other party. This arrangement would insure that
this would be done.
For ten years after the plant completion date, the plant would
be prevented from exporting products to the country from which
the technology came. The concern that some have in making
technology available to others is that a potential competitor is
created. It is probable that during the first ten years of operation
the plant would only be able to supply the product to the developing country and other nearby countries. After the first ten
years, the technology owner should have no objection to importation. Of course, this importation could only be prevented if the
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technology owner still has unexpired patents to prevent such importation. In some situations the transferee plant could be expected to compete with the transferor in third country markets.
Specific arrangements may be necessary to induce the transferor
to voluntarily part with control over his technology.
Vii.

CONCLUSION

Despite negotiations involving technology transfer between developed nations and developing nations, no real increase in technology transfer has taken place. The negotiations have not really
helped developing nations. Unless a program, such as that suggested by the LES, is adopted to provide incentives for technology owners to transfer their technology, it will be difficult for the
developing nations to raise their standards of living.

